In Chapter Three, Peregrin gets formally precise about inferential roles. Following Brandom, Peregrin calls the resulting idea "Strong Inferentialism." Otherwise, it cannot adequately account for the meanings of empirical terms, such as 'mammal,' and 'animal,' terms which are distinguished partly by being properly used in response to relevant, observable circumstances. Second, inferentialism must also admit rules for transitions from observable circumstances to sentences. First, it must admit some "material" rules of inference, ones that hold not in virtue of their so-called logical form but in virtue of the non-logical terms they involve, such as a rule licensing the inference from 'This is a mammal' to 'This is an animal.' Without such rules, no account of the meaning of non-logical terms - 'mammal', 'animal', 'quark' and 'justice' - could be given, since there would be no way to distinguish between such terms. In Chapter Two, Peregrin contends that normative inferentialism must broaden the notion of a rule of inference in two ways. Unlike its causal sibling, the explanans is good or proper inference (hence norms of inference), not just inference of any sort. Normative inferentialism, by contrast, holds that the meaning of a word is constituted by rules or norms governing inferences that speakers might make involving that word. Causal inferentialism holds that the meaning of a word (e.g., 'Regel') is constituted by the inferences that people make or are disposed to make involving that word. In Chapter One, Peregrin argues for normative inferentialism over causal inferentialism. Let me first briefly summarize each chapter, and then I will indicate a few ways in which the book could have addressed some important topics more thoroughly. While Peregrin and Brandom agree about many important points, Inferentialism offers readers something new. That allows him to explore topics that Brandom does not explore in much detail in either of his books, especially aspects of inferentialism about logic. Peregrin's book, by contrast, covers less terrain, primarily language and logic. Both of Brandom's books cover a lot of philosophical terrain (language, mind, knowledge, action, and logic). It is a welcome complement to Robert Brandom's Articulating Reasons, an abbreviated form of his Making It Explicit, which are currently the most prominent and influential statements of inferentialism. Inferentialism is a clear and helpful presentation of its namesake theory. Jaroslav Peregrin articulates and defends a version of that idea, stressing (in Part I) the importance of rules, and highlighting (in Part II) how the idea applies to logical vocabulary and laws of logic. According to inferentialism, 'Regel' and other words of natural languages have meanings because they have inferential roles they have the specific meanings they do because they have the specific inferential roles they do.
This book is an essential resource for scholars and researchers engaged with the foundations of logical theories and the philosophy of language.'Regel' means rule, but it didn't have to mean that, or anything at all. They suggest that we can profit from viewing languages as inferential landscapes and logicians as geographers who map them and try to pave safe routes through them. By carefully scrutinizing the project of logical analysis, the authors demonstrate that logical rules can be best seen as products of the so called reflective equilibrium. Peregrin and Svoboda also show that logical theories, despite the fact that they rely on rules implicit to our actual linguistic practice, firm up these rules and make them explicit.
In this sense, fundamental logical laws are implicit to our language games and are thus more similar to social norms than to the laws of nature. They present a systematic argument that the primary subject matter of logic is our linguistic interaction rather than our private reasoning and it is thus misleading to see logic as revealing the laws of thought. The authors claim that these foundations can not only be established without the need for strong metaphysical assumptions, but also without hypostasizing logical forms as specific entities. This book offers a comprehensive account of logic that addresses fundamental issues concerning the nature and foundations of the discipline.
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